Innovations for Poverty Action

Delivering genetic innovations to farmers: Challenges and opportunities for accelerated varietal turnover

Short-term and long-term effects of cash for work: Evidence from a randomized controlled trial in Tunisia

While a growing literature analyzes the economic effects of cash for work programs in developing countries, there remains little evidence about the longer-term effects of these interventions. This paper presents findings from a randomized controlled trial evaluating a three month intervention providing public works em ployment in rural Tunisia. The evaluation design incorporates two dimensions of randomization — community-level randomization to treatment and control, and individual-level randomization among eligible individuals — and a sample of 2,718 individuals was tracked over five years. The findings suggest that cash for work leads to significant increases in labor market engagement, assets, consumption, financial inclusion, civic engagement, psychological well being, and women’s em powerment one-year post-treatment; however, these effects have largely attenuated to zero five years post-treatment, with the exception of a positive effect on assets. There is also evidence of positive spillover effects within treatment communities, but these effects similarly attenuate over time.

Download

The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas.